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Leave No Soldier Behind? The Legality of the 
Bowe Bergdahl Prisoner Swap 
STEVEN M. MAFFUCCI† 
INTRODUCTION 
On May 31, 2014, President Obama announced the 
recovery of the lone American prisoner of war from the 
Afghan conflict, U.S. Army Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl.1 This 
seemingly momentous occasion, however, was quickly 
shrouded in controversy.2 Most notably, there were 
assertions from members of Bergdahl’s unit that he had 
deserted, and that fellow soldiers had needlessly died in the 
search following Bergdahl’s disappearance.3 There were 
complaints that the cost associated with recovering 
Bergdahl, particularly the five Taliban prisoners for whom 
Bergdahl was exchanged, was too high, and that the Obama 
  
† J.D. Candidate, Class of 2016, SUNY Buffalo Law School. Thanks to the 
dedicated associates and editors of the Buffalo Law Review for their insightful 
suggestions and support. 
 1. Eric Schmitt & Charlie Savage, Bowe Bergdahl, American Soldier, Freed 
by Taliban in Prisoner Trade, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2014), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2014/06/01/us/bowe-bergdahl-american-soldier-is-freed-by-taliban.
html?_r=0.  
 2. Tom Hamburger & Kevin Sieff, Joy About Bergdahl Release Gives Way to 




 3. Eric Schmitt et al., Bowe Bergdahl’s Vanishing Before Capture Angered His 
Unit, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/03/us/us-
soldier-srgt-bowe-bergdahl-of-idaho-pow-vanished-angered-his-unit.html?_r=0.  
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Administration had violated a central foreign policy directive 
to not negotiate with terrorists.4 Above all, however, 
members of Congress argued that the Obama Administration 
had broken the law by failing to notify Congress thirty days 
before the release of the Taliban prisoners, as required by the 
National Defense Authorization Act for 2014.5 
This claim by members of Congress raises a novel 
question: Does the President have exclusive authority to 
secure the release of U.S. service members taken captive 
during combat operations in a foreign country? This 
Comment evaluates two prominent legal theories, one 
statutory and the other constitutional, proffered by the 
Obama Administration in response to its critics. This 
Comment concludes that the Administration’s theories fail to 
provide definitive authority for the President’s exchange for 
Bergdahl. In light of that conclusion, this Comment argues 
that policy concerns, most importantly the military ethos to 
leave no soldier behind, necessitate that Congress and the 
judiciary recognize exclusive authority for the executive 
branch in this area. 
This Comment will proceed as follows: Part I will present 
the available information concerning the circumstances 
surrounding the exchange for Bergdahl. Part II explains the 
relevant provisions of the National Defense Authorization 
Act for 2014 and outlines the legal theories put forth by the 
Obama Administration in defense of its action. Part III will 
evaluate the efficacy of the Administration’s theories. Part IV 
discusses the important policy concerns that support 
recognizing unilateral authority for the executive branch in 
securing the release of U.S. service members taken captive 
during combat operations in a foreign country. 
  
 4. Hamburger & Sieff, supra note 2. 
 5. Id.; see National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. 
No. 113-66, 127 Stat. 672 (2013). 
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I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE EXCHANGE 
Sergeant Bergdahl6 left his unit’s outpost in Paktika 
Province, Afghanistan sometime after midnight on June 30, 
2009.7 A frantic search for Bergdahl followed, and resources 
would continue to be diverted to the search for ninety days 
after his disappearance without success.8 Following the failed 
search, direct talks between the United States and the 
Taliban over the release of Bergdahl began in November 2010 
in Munich but failed to progress for a variety of reasons.9 
Direct talks soon ended and, instead, the two sides began a 
negotiation process using intermediaries starting in early 
2012.10 The government of Qatar was the primary 
intermediary during this process and would prove pivotal in 
reaching a final agreement.11 
From the start, the central piece of any deal between the 
two sides involved an exchange for five Taliban detainees 
held by the United States at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.12 
Though the deal was far from complete, the Obama 
Administration briefed congressional leaders in late 2011 
and early 2012 of this potential exchange, but the plan was 
met with strong concerns.13 Despite these views, the 
  
 6. Bergdahl was actually a Private First Class at this time and was promoted 
while in captivity. See Schmitt et al., supra note 3. 
 7.  See id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Adam Entous & Julian E. Barnes, Behind Bowe Bergdahl’s Release, A 
Secret Deal that Took Three Years, WALL ST. J. (June 1, 2014), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/behind-bergdahls-release-a-secret-deal-that-took-
three-years-1401673547.  
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Charlie Savage & David E. Sanger, Deal to Free Bowe Bergdahl Puts 
Obama on Defensive, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/06/04/world/prisoner-deal-puts-president-on-defensive.html; see also Press 
Release, John Boehner, Speaker of the House, Statement on Congressional 
Concerns Raised About Prisoner Exchange (June 3, 2014), 
http://www.speaker.gov/press-release/boehner-statement-congressional-
concerns-raised-about-prisoner-exchange [hereinafter Press Release] (“More than 
two years ago, Members of Congress were briefed on the possibility of such an 
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Administration continued the negotiation process to secure 
Bergdahl’s release. Although talks bogged down in late 2012, 
the potential for an agreement gained promise in September 
2013 when the Taliban sent a message through the Qataris 
that they were ready to re-engage in negotiations.14 Following 
that message, a proof of life video sent by the Taliban to the 
United States government in January 2014 sparked a sense 
of urgency within the Obama Administration, as Bergdahl 
appeared to be in severely declining health.15 Over the next 
few months, meetings between U.S. officials and the Taliban 
through Qatari intermediaries produced the framework for 
the agreement, and terms of the deal came together a few 
days before the exchange took place.16 
Although the Administration had previously 
acknowledged the need to inform Congress prior to any 
exchange involving Guantanamo detainees,17 congressional 
leaders were not notified of the Bergdahl swap until the day 
of the exchange.18 Accordingly, after United States Special 
Forces confirmed that Bergdahl was in hand, guards at 
Guantanamo simply transferred the five former Taliban 
  
exchange, and the chairmen at the time and I raised serious questions to the 
administration.”). 
 14. Entous & Barnes, supra note 9. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice 
of the United States Relating to International Law: General International and 
U.S. Foreign Relations Law: United States Negotiates Prisoner Exchange to 
Secure Release of U.S. Soldier Held in Afghanistan, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 517, 519 
(2014). 
 18. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, B-326013, DEPARTMENT OF 
DEFENSE—COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT 3 (2014) 
(noting that the Secretary of Defense provided written notice on May 31, 2014 to 
the appropriate congressional committees). However, there is some dispute as to 
when and how notice was provided. See id. at 4; Burgess Everett & John 
Bresnahan, Hill Leaders Didn’t Know of Swap, POLITICO (June 3, 2014, 12:04 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/06/harry-reid-bowe-bergdahl-briefedprisoner-
deal-white-house-107373. 
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commanders19 to the team from Qatar.20 Immediately 
following the exchange, several members of Congress 
expressed their anger at not having been informed prior to 
the trade.21 Chief among the concerns raised was that the 
Obama Administration had broken the law by failing to 
notify Congress thirty days prior to releasing any detainee 
from Guantanamo as required by the National Defense 
Authorization Act for 2014.22  
II. THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT AND THE 
ADMINISTRATION’S POSITION 
The National Defense Authorization Act for 2014 (“2014 
NDAA”) is an appropriations bill that authorizes funding for 
the Department of Defense.23 Beginning in 2011, this bill 
became a vehicle to restrict the President’s ability to transfer 
detainees out of Guantanamo Bay.24 In 2014, Congress eased 
some of the restrictions on transferring detainees to foreign 
countries; however, the remaining restrictions form the basis 
of the charge that the Obama Administration broke the law. 
Specifically, the 2014 NDAA authorizes the Secretary of 
Defense “to transfer or release any individual detained at 
Guantanamo to the individual’s country of origin, or any 
other foreign country” provided that certain conditions are 
  
 19. Schmitt & Savage, supra note 1. The detainees were Mohammed Nabi 
Omari, Mullah Norullah Noori, Mullah Mohammed Fazl, Abdul Haq Wasiq, and 
Khirullah Said Wali Khairkhwa. Id. For a brief description of each, see The Gitmo 
Detainees Swapped for Bergdahl: Who Are They?, CNN (May 31, 2014), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/31/us/bergdahl-transferred-guantanamo-detainees. 
 20. Entous & Barnes, supra note 9. 
 21. Schmitt & Savage, supra note 1. 
 22. See id. Notably, two other laws may also have been implicated here, Section 
8111 of the Fiscal Year 2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act as well as the Anti-
Deficiency Act. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 18, at 1. 
Because violations of each of these acts are dependent on a violation of the NDAA, 
this Comment does not expressly address them. 
 23. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-
66, 127 Stat. 672 (2013). 
 24. See David J.R. Frakt, Prisoners of Congress: The Constitutional and 
Political Clash Over Detainees and the Closure of Guantanamo, 74 U. PITT. L. REV. 
179, 203 (2012) (noting that the 2011 National Defense Authorization Act was the 
“final nail in the coffin” of President Obama’s plan to close Guantanamo). 
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met.25 First, section 1035(b) requires that the Secretary of 
Defense ensure that steps have been taken to “substantially 
mitigate the risk of such individual engaging or reengaging 
in any terrorist or hostile activity that threatens the United 
States or United States persons or interests” and that “the 
transfer is in the national security interest of the United 
States.”26 Although some members of Congress have 
questioned the adequacy of the security measures taken,27 
the Administration has largely not been accused of violating 
this section. The section of the 2014 NDAA that is regularly 
noted by critics of the Bergdahl swap, section 1035(d), reads 
as follows: “The Secretary of Defense shall notify the 
appropriate committees of Congress of a determination of the 
Secretary under subsection (a) or (b) not later than 30 days 
before the transfer or release of the individual under such 
subsection.”28 
As in previous years, President Obama signed the 2014 
NDAA into law accompanied by a signing statement that 
addressed several concerns about its restrictions on 
Guantanamo detainees.29 In particular, President Obama 
noted that section 1035 “in certain circumstances, would 
violate constitutional separation of powers principles. The 
  
 25. National Defense Authorization Act § 1035(a). 
 26. Id. § 1035(b)(1)-(2). 
 27. Brian Knowlton, Administration Defends Swap With Taliban to Free U.S. 
Soldier, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/02/ 
us/politics/bowe-bergdahl.html. 
 28. National Defense Authorization Act § 1035(d).  
The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means— (A) the 
Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
Committee on Appropriations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence 
of the Senate; and (B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee 
on Appropriations, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
Representatives.  
Id. § 1035(e). 
 29. Notably, President Obama did not raise constitutional issues with the 
restrictions on the transfer and release of Guantanamo detainees until his signing 
statement accompanying the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act, and at 
least one commentator believes that this change in attitude was the result of 
ongoing negotiations to trade for Sgt. Bergdahl. Frakt, supra note 24, at 244. 
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executive branch must have the flexibility, among other 
things, to act swiftly in conducting negotiations with foreign 
countries regarding the circumstances of detainee 
transfers.”30 He went on to assert that, in circumstances 
where section 1035 violates separation of powers principles, 
“my Administration will implement [section 1035] in a 
manner that avoids the constitutional conflict.”31  
Presidents have used signing statements throughout 
history as a way to offer their interpretations of legislation 
they are signing into law,32 and the President’s signing 
statement here provides the basis for the Administration’s 
defense of the Bergdahl swap. Although different members of 
the Administration have given various rationales for failing 
to notify Congress, the Administration clearly articulated its 
stance in a response to a Government Accountability Office 
Report that concluded a violation of law had occurred.33 The 
Administration’s defense is best understood in terms of two 
distinct legal theories, one statutory and the other 
constitutional.34 The statutory theory, heretofore the “implied 
  
 30. Presidential Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2014, 2013 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 876, at 1 (Dec. 26, 2013). 
 31. Id. at 2. 
 32. Neal R. Sonnett, AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON 
PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE 6 
(2006). 
 33. See Benjamin Wittes, Administration Response to GAO Report on Berdahl, 
LAWFARE BLOG (Aug. 23, 2014, 12:00 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/
administration-response-gao-report-bergdahl (follow “this document” hyperlink 
for a cloud version of the Administration Response). 
 34. The Administration also provides another statutory explanation, 
specifically, that its failure to notify Congress did not make its action “unlawful” 
under the National Defense Authorization Act. Id. The GAO Report convincingly 
finds this theory unpersuasive and, therefore, this Comment does not address it. 
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 18, at 4. A third statutory 
theory, articulated by Ohio State Law Professor Peter M. Shane, observes that 
the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force in Afghanistan and the 
Hostage Act may give the President the authority needed for the exchange, and 
that the 30-day notice requirement in the 2014 NDAA could not, by implication, 
repeal the statutory authority already given to the President by those acts. Peter 
M. Shane, The Non-Constitutional Non-Crisis, SLATE (June 5, 2014, 4:41 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/06/stop_sayi
ng_that_the_exchange_of_prisoners_for_bergdahl_was_illegal_the.html. 
Although similar to the Administration’s implied exception argument, this 
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exception” theory, construes the section 1035(d) 30-day 
notice requirement as being inapplicable to circumstances 
where the transfer of a Guantanamo detainee would secure 
the release of a captive U.S. soldier and the Secretary of 
Defense determines that providing the requisite notice to 
Congress could endanger the soldier’s life.35 The 
constitutional theory, heretofore the “constitutional override” 
theory, asserts that, even if the 30-day notice requirement 
applies in situations such as the Bergdahl swap, it is 
unconstitutional as applied to those circumstances because 
the notice requirement impinges on the President’s 
constitutional mandate to protect the lives of American 
citizens and soldiers.36 
III. DID THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION BREAK THE LAW? 
A. The Implied Exception Theory 
The idea that the Bergdahl swap is excepted from the 30-
day notice requirement presents a question of statutory 
interpretation. Immediately following the exchange, the 
Obama Administration consistently noted that a primary 
reason for ignoring the notice requirement was because they 
were concerned with Bergdahl’s health and that any leak of 
the deal could cause the Taliban to withdraw.37 These 
concerns form the foundation of the Administration’s 
assertion that the notice requirement did not apply in this 
circumstance. In particular, the Administration noted:  
delaying the transfer in order to provide the 30-day notice would 
interfere with the Executive’s performance of two related functions 
that the Constitution assigns to the President: protecting the lives 
of Americans abroad and protecting U.S. soldiers. Because such 
interference would significantly alter the balance between 
  
Comment does not address this theory as it was not expressly articulated by the 
Administration. 
 35. See Wittes, supra note 33; see also E-mail from the NSC Press Office, to 
Caitlin Hayden, NSC Spokesperson, National Security Council, (June 3, 2014, 
1:27 PM), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1180482-nsc-statement-on-
30-day-transfer-notice-law.html. 
 36. See National Security Council, supra note 35; Wittes, supra note 33. 
 37. Schmitt & Savage, supra note 1. 
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Congress and the President, and could even raise constitutional 
concerns, we believe it is fair to conclude that Congress did not 
intend that the Administration would be barred from taking the 
action it did in these circumstances.38  
In making this argument, the Administration relied on 
the “clear statement” principle of statutory construction.39 
Clear statement rules have been used by the Supreme Court 
to protect important constitutional principles in a number of 
contexts.40 In general, these rules require Congress to clearly 
announce its intention to intrude on some constitutional 
value, such as disrupting the constitutional balance between 
the states and federal government or between the branches 
of the federal government.41 This principle allows the Court 
to avoid tackling a constitutional question head-on.42 
Accordingly, “where an otherwise acceptable construction of 
a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the 
Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless 
such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of 
Congress.”43 
Here, the Obama Administration argues that Congress 
did not make its intent clear on whether the notice 
requirement was meant to intrude on the President’s 
constitutionally assigned authority to protect U.S. civilians 
and soldiers (“power to protect”). Therefore, because “the 
notice requirement does not in its terms apply to a time-
sensitive prisoner exchange designed to save the life of a U.S. 
soldier,” a court would apply the clear statement rule and 
read an implied exception into the requirement.44 On its face, 
  
 38. National Security Council, supra note 35. 
 39. See Wittes, supra note 33 (quoting Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 289 
(D.C. Cir. 1991)). 
 40. See Gillian E. Metzger & Trevor W. Morrison, The Presumption of 
Constitutionality and the Individual Mandate, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1720-
24 (2013); see also John Copeland Nagle, Waiving Sovereign Immunity in an Age 
of Clear Statement Rules, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 771, 771-72 (1995). 
 41. See Metzger & Morrison, supra note 40; Nagle, supra note 40. 
 42. See Metzger & Morrison, supra note 40; Nagle, supra note 40. 
 43. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades 
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1998). 
 44. See Wittes, supra note 33. 
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the Administration’s rationale appears sound. However, a 
closer look at this principle of statutory construction leads to 
the conclusion that this analysis is far from certain. 
Much of the scholarship on the issue of clear statement 
rules demonstrates that the Supreme Court’s use of these 
rules is not all that clear.45 Notably, some clear statement 
rules are stronger than others.46 For example, the clear 
statement rule that governs statutory interpretation 
questions involving the abrogation of state sovereign 
immunity is widely considered the strongest articulation of 
these rules.47 On the other hand, a clear statement rule 
“against congressional curtailment of the judiciary’s 
‘inherent powers’” is viewed as less strong.48 In order to accept 
the Administration’s application of the clear statement 
principle, one would have to believe that in cases where the 
Executive’s power to protect is potentially implicated, the 
Court would require an “unmistakably clear” statement that 
Congress intended to restrict this power.49 In other words, it 
would require the strongest form of the clear statement 
construct. 
There is some reason to believe that this is an accurate 
formulation of the issue. In Department of the Navy v. Egan, 
the Supreme Court recognized that “unless Congress 
specifically has provided otherwise, courts traditionally have 
been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive 
in military and national security affairs.”50 Such strong 
language can be read as articulating a clear statement rule 
against congressional interference with presidential 
  
 45. See Nagle, supra note 40, at 771-73; see also Trevor W. Morrison, 
Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1212-
15 (2006). 
 46. See Nagle, supra note 40, at 772-73. 
 47. See id. at 771-73; see also Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 
242 (1985) (“Congress may abrogate the States’ constitutionally secured 
immunity from suit in federal court only by making its intention unmistakably 
clear in the language of the statute.”). 
 48. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 325 (1994) 
(quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991)). 
 49. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242. 
 50. Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988). 
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authority over foreign affairs and national security that is 
equivalent to that of the “[s]uper-strong” rule against 
abrogation of state sovereign immunity.51 Since the Bergdahl 
exchange may fairly be considered an exercise of the 
President’s authority over foreign affairs and national 
security, the Administration may be correct in asserting that 
Congress had to note specifically that that 30-day notice 
requirement covers situations that implicate the President’s 
power to protect. 
On the other hand, it can be argued that interpretation 
of this statute under any clear statement principle is 
unwarranted. The point of such a statutory construction tool 
is to maintain the status quo in the face of an ambiguous 
statute.52 In other words, if a statute is unambiguous and, 
consequently, has no plausible alternative meaning, then 
there is nothing for the clear statement rule to engage. Here, 
the statute is not ambiguous as it pertains to restricting the 
President’s ability to release detainees from Guantanamo. 
The language of section 1035(d) of the 2014 NDAA is 
unequivocal—“[t]he Secretary of Defense shall notify the 
appropriate committees of Congress . . . not later than 30 
days before the transfer or release of the individual.”53 
Therefore, the plain language of the statute leaves no 
understanding of Congress’s intent other than that the notice 
requirement applies in all situations concerning the release 
of Guantanamo prisoners—regardless of any independent 
authority the President may have over wartime detainees in 
exercising his power to protect. As such, it is unnecessary to 
interpret the statute under the lens of a clear statement rule. 
The plain text of the statute further disputes any 
argument for an implied exception under a clear statement 
rule when one considers that there are exceptions throughout 
the statute in consideration of time sensitive issues.54 “When 
Congress provides exceptions in a statute, it does not follow 
  
 51. ESKRIDGE, supra note 48, at 325-26. 
 52. See Nagle, supra note 40, at 802-03. 
 53. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-
66, § 1035(d), 127 Stat. 672, 853 (2013) (emphasis added). 
 54. See, e.g., id. § 1041(a)(1). 
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that courts have authority to create others. The proper 
inference . . . is that Congress considered the issue of 
exceptions and, in the end, limited the statute to the ones set 
forth.”55 Therefore, combined with the absence of any 
ambiguity in the statute’s terms, and contrary to the 
Administration’s argument, any exception to the notice 
requirement, including that of a time-sensitive prisoner 
exchange, would actually need to be express. This argument 
is buttressed by the fact that Congress was notified of a 
possible swap for Bergdahl as early as late 2011, and 
congressional leaders expressed concern at having to release 
the five Taliban detainees as part of the deal.56 As a result, 
Congress understood that there was a potential exchange of 
Guantanamo detainees for an American prisoner of war prior 
to writing the 2014 NDAA and, therefore, could have 
incorporated this exception when it wrote the bill. Whether 
they considered this in drafting the provisions for section 
1035 is certainly debatable, however, it is a difficult 
argument to make. 
In sum, for the Administration’s implied exception theory 
to hold true, the 30-day notice requirement must be subject 
to the strongest form of the clear statement construct. 
Although such construction cannot be ruled out entirely, 
several factors weigh heavily against it. In particular, the 
statute unambiguously restricts the authority that the 
executive branch has over the release of Guantanamo 
detainees without exception. Such language makes it 
difficult to get to the clear statement principle since where a 
statute is clear and unambiguous, the plain meaning of its 
language controls.57 Furthermore, when placing the statute 
in the context of what Congress knew when it wrote the bill, 
the Administration’s use of the implied exception reasoning 
appears especially weak. Therefore, while the Supreme 
Court’s uncertain use of clear statement rules leaves open the 
possibility for the implied exception theory to stand, the 
Administration’s first theory in defense of its action fails to 
definitively answer whether the swap was lawful. 
  
 55. United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 58 (2000). 
 56. Press Release, supra note 13. 
 57. See, e.g., Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 387 (2009). 
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B. The Constitutional Override Theory 
The second theory used by the Administration to justify 
the legality of the Bergdahl swap is its constitutional 
override theory. Specifically, the Administration stated: 
[i]f section 1035(d) were construed as applicable to the transfer, the 
statute would be unconstitutional as applied because requiring 30 
days’ notice of the transfer would have violated the constitutionally-
mandated separation of powers. Compliance with a 30 days’ notice 
requirement in these circumstances would have “prevent[ed] the 
Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned 
functions,” Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 695 (1988), without 
being “justified by an overriding need” to promote legitimate 
objectives of Congress, Nixon v. Administrator of General Servs., 
433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).58 
In other words, the Administration argues that executive 
branch power overrides the 30-day notice requirement in 
situations such as the Bergdahl swap. This assertion of 
executive power implicates the third category of the 
executive-legislative power dynamic suggested by Justice 
Jackson in his concurrence to Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. 
v. Sawyer.59 Category Three of Justice Jackson’s analysis 
addresses situations where the President has taken action 
that is “incompatible with the expressed or implied will of 
Congress.”60 Jackson concludes that in such situations the 
President’s power is at its “lowest ebb,” and the President 
“can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any 
constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.”61 
Although Jackson’s mathematical formulation is rather 
straightforward, his analysis does not provide any guidance 
on how to determine which presidential powers would 
survive Category Three scrutiny.62 Therefore, a framework 
  
 58. Wittes, supra note 33. 
 59. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-38 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See id. at 638-40; William M. Hains, Comment, Challenging the Executive: 
The Constitutionality of Congressional Regulation of the President’s Wartime 
Detention Policies, 2011 BYU L. REV. 2283, 2293. 
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must be identified to analyze the relevant executive and 
legislative powers at play in the Bergdahl exchange and 
ultimately determine the veracity of the Administration’s 
override claim.  
In determining that it had acted lawfully, the 
Administration applied a framework from Morrison v. Olson 
and Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, whereby the 
President’s constitutional prerogative is balanced against the 
interests of Congress.63 In applying this framework, the 
Administration concluded that: 
Congress’s desire to have 30 days to weigh in on the determination 
that the Secretary had already made, in accordance with criteria 
specified by Congress, that the transfer did not pose the risks that 
Congress was seeking to avoid, was not a sufficiently weighty 
interest to justify this frustration of the Executive’s ability to carry 
out these constitutionally assigned functions.64 
The Administration provided scant analysis to support 
its assertion, and the relative ease with which its argument 
dispatches with Congress’s restriction is an example of why 
this separation of powers test has been dismissed as an 
approach in “drawing a clear line between the President’s 
Commander in Chief power and Congress’s war powers.”65 In 
addition, this framework has been criticized for failing to 
explain “why certain core executive powers . . . cannot be 
infringed, even though it is generally understood that such 
inviolable cores might exist,” and, therefore, “not actually 
resolv[ing] the question that arises in a Youngstown 
Category Three case.”66  
For these reasons, the Administration’s separation of 
powers approach fails to adequately assess its constitutional 
override theory and, accordingly, a different framework must 
  
 63. Wittes, supra note 33 (citing Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 695 (1988); 
Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)). 
 64. See Wittes, supra note 33. 
 65. Jules Lobel, Conflicts Between The Commander in Chief and Congress: 
Concurrent Power Over the Conduct of War, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 391, 406-07 (2008). 
 66. David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the 
Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 
HARV. L. REV. 689, 738 (2008) [hereinafter Framing the Problem]. 
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be used. Although there are many theories with which to 
address the constitutional powers question at issue here,67 
the “core/periphery” framework established by Professors 
David J. Barron and Martin S. Lederman allows for a 
comprehensive and complete assessment of the 
Administration’s constitutional override theory.68 This 
framework relies on the understanding that the Constitution 
affords the President “at least two types of constitutional 
powers: those that he may exercise on his own but that are 
regulable by statute, and those that form the ‘core’ . . . of the 
Executive’s powers.”69 In other words, there are those powers 
that the President may exercise absent congressional 
authorization, or independent powers, and those powers 
“that establish not only a power to act in the absence of 
legislative authorization, but also an indefeasible scope of 
discretion,” or preclusive powers.70 Furthermore, in 
attempting to determine the extent of the President’s 
preclusive wartime authority under this framework, Barron 
and Lederman examined Supreme Court doctrine, founding-
era views, historical practice of both the legislative and 
executive branches, and a range of scholarly commentary.71 
This Comment follows a similar analytical path. 
Now that a framework to assess the Administration’s 
override theory has been chosen, the issues to which it 
applies must be defined. As the core/periphery framework 
suggests, the President must have had preclusive power to 
execute the Bergdahl exchange for the Administration’s 
override theory to prove correct. Since the Administration 
characterized the Bergdahl swap narrowly—“a time-
sensitive prisoner exchange designed to save the life of a U.S. 
soldier”72—there are two questions worth addressing in the 
  
 67. For a discussion of alternative theories, see id. at 737-50. 
 68. Id. at 726. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See generally id.; David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander 
in Chief at the Lowest Ebb — A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941 
(2008) [hereinafter A Constitutional History]. 
 72. Wittes, supra note 33.  
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context of the Administration’s override argument: (1) does 
the President have preclusive authority over all prisoner of 
war exchanges;73 and, if not, (2) does the President, at the 
very least, have preclusive authority over prisoner of war 
exchanges where a U.S. soldier’s life is in imminent danger?74  
1. The President’s Authority over Prisoner of War 
Exchanges 
The debate over the extent of the President’s war powers 
has been in full swing since the George W. Bush 
Administration and its affirmation of broad presidential war 
powers that asserted for the President near total exclusivity 
in wartime decisions regardless of congressional legislation.75 
Over the last several years, this articulation of the 
President’s war powers has been called into question by 
many scholars76 and has also been avoided by the Obama 
Administration.77 If anything, the pendulum has swung in 
the opposite direction. What was once considered 
conventional wisdom, that Congress could not restrict day-
to-day conduct of authorized military operations, is now met 
with deep skepticism.78 However, although recent 
examinations of historical and Supreme Court precedent 
mostly conclude that Congress and the President have 
  
 73. As will be discussed below, this question involves the implication of a power 
not expressly addressed by the Administration in its override rationale. However, 
examination of this issue lays the groundwork for the overall constitutional 
questions at issue here. 
 74. Though it could be argued that any potential prisoner of war exchange 
where a U.S. soldier is held captive necessarily involves a threat to that soldier’s 
life, based upon the Administration’s decision to color the Bergdahl situation as 
a “unique circumstance[ ],” this Comment accepts a distinction between a prisoner 
exchange where the executive branch has determined that there is an imminent 
threat to a U.S. soldier’s life and one that does not. Wittes, supra note 33. 
 75. See Framing the Problem, supra note 66, at 694; see also Frakt, supra note 
24, at 233. 
 76. See, e.g., Framing the Problem, supra note 66; Hains, supra note 62; Lobel, 
supra note 65. 
 77. Frakt, supra note 24, at 237. 
 78. See id. at 233-37. 
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concurrent war powers,79 it is still generally accepted that 
there remains a preclusive core to the President’s war 
powers.80 
With respect to the President’s authority over prisoner of 
war exchanges, it is widely understood that such power 
comes from the Commander in Chief clause.81 More 
specifically, the President’s authority over wartime 
detainees, and by corollary his authority over prisoner of war 
exchanges, is an incidental power under the Commander in 
Chief clause that activates following congressional 
authorization of an armed conflict.82 In the context of the 
Bergdahl exchange, the Authorization for Use of Military 
Force of 2001 (“AUMF”)83 activated the President’s detention 
authority over prisoners from the Afghan conflict.84 As such, 
there is little doubt that, absent the 2014 NDAA, the 
  
 79. See, e.g., Framing the Problem, supra note 66; Frakt, supra note 24; Hains, 
supra note 62; Lobel, supra note 65, at 463.  
 80. See Framing the Problem, supra note 66, at 800 (finding the preclusive core 
of the President’s Commander-in-Chief authority to include only that of 
“superintendence”); Lobel, supra note 65, at 393 (concluding that “the only 
Commander in Chief power that Congress cannot override is the President’s 
power to command”). 
 81. See Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942); Oona Hathaway et al., The 
Power to Detain: Detention of Terrorism Suspects After 9/11, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 
123, 147-49 (2011). 
 82. See Ex Parte Quirin, 317 US. at 28; Hathaway et al., supra note 81; see also 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (plurality opinion) (quoting Ex parte 
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28, 30). 
 83. See Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces 
Against Those Responsible for the Recent Attacks Launched against the United 
States, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). The AUMF was passed by 
Congress days after the September 11, 2001, attacks and signed by the President 
shortly thereafter. It authorizes the President to: 
use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, 
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, 
or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or 
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future 
acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, 
organizations or persons. 
Id. 
 84. Framing the Problem, supra note 66, at 731. 
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President had the authority to exchange the five Taliban 
prisoners for Bergdahl. 
What is less clear, however, is whether the President’s 
authority over prisoner of war exchanges via the Commander 
in Chief clause is part of the preclusive core of presidential 
war powers. As one might expect, there is no clear answer to 
this question. The recent scholarship that has acknowledged 
concurrent war powers between the executive and legislative 
branches would likely argue that it is not part of the 
preclusive core. For instance, multiple studies have 
concluded that the only preclusive power provided by the 
Commander in Chief clause is the power of 
superintendence.85 Such determinations leave no room to 
argue that the power to conduct prisoner of war exchanges is 
preclusive, as it cannot be logically argued that the power is 
somehow contained in the President’s hierarchal superiority 
in the military chain of command. Furthermore, two other 
commentators have specifically concluded that the 
restrictions on the release of Guantanamo detainees placed 
in various iterations of the NDAA are a constitutional 
exercise of Congress’s concurrent war powers.86 
However, such analyses do not completely disqualify the 
override theory. With regard to detention authority, these 
analyses focused solely on what authority, if any, Congress 
had over wartime detainees.87 In particular, they were 
concerned with certain transfer restrictions contained in 
prior iterations of the NDAA as well as evaluating claims 
made by the Bush Administration concerning its authority 
over the treatment and disposition of detainees from the 
  
 85. See id. at 800; Lobel, supra note 65, at 393. Barron and Lederman describe 
the power of superintendence as the President’s “control over the vast reservoirs 
of military discretion that exist in every armed conflict, even when bounded by 
important statutory limitations; and thus Congress may not assign such ultimate 
decisionmaking discretion to anyone else (including subordinate military 
officers).” Framing the Problem, supra note 66, at 696-97. 
 86. Frakt, supra note 24, at 236-37; Hains, supra note 62, at 2283. 
 87. See generally Framing the Problem, supra note 66; Frakt, supra note 24; 
Hains, supra note 62; Lobel, supra note 65. 
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Afghan conflict.88 In concluding that Congress did have 
concurrent authority over wartime detainees, these 
commentators found the power in various sources, including 
the Captures Clause, Law of Nations Clause, the Declare 
War Clause, and the power of the purse.89 Clearly, these 
analyses provide strong evidence that Congress has 
concurrent authority over wartime detainees. In fact, the 
Obama Administration has even acknowledged such 
authority by accepting the general constitutionality of the 
restrictions on Guantanamo detainees in the 2014 NDAA.90 
However, none of the aforementioned analyses dealt 
specifically with exchanging wartime detainees for an 
American prisoner of war. The mere fact that Congress has 
concurrent authority over wartime detainees does not itself 
foreclose the potential that the more nuanced issue of 
exchanging wartime detainees for a captive U.S. soldier lies 
exclusively with the executive branch. Thus, while the 30-day 
notice requirement in the 2014 NDAA may be constitutional 
in general, recent scholarly work does not provide a definitive 
answer as to whether it may be unconstitutional in situations 
where Guantanamo detainees are exchanged for an 
American prisoner of war, and, more generally, whether the 
President has preclusive authority over all prisoner of war 
exchanges. 
A brief look at Supreme Court doctrine is similarly 
unhelpful. In particular, “the Court has yet to resolve 
definitively the precise contours of Congress’s powers to 
control the President’s war powers.”91 Fairly recently, in 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Court seemingly reiterated 
support for a somewhat broad preclusive core to the 
President’s war powers when the majority quoted Chief 
Justice Chase’s concurrence to Ex Parte Milligan to describe 
  
 88. See Framing the Problem, supra note 66; Frakt, supra note 24; Hains, 
supra note 62; Lobel, supra note 65. 
 89. Framing the Problem, supra note 66; Hains, supra note 62. 
 90. Wittes, supra note 33 (“Thus, even though, as a general matter, Congress 
had authority under its constitutional powers related to war and the military to 
enact section 1035(d), that provision would have been unconstitutional to the 
extent it applied to the unique circumstances of this transfer.”). 
 91. Framing the Problem, supra note 66, at 766. 
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the interplay between the President and Congress’s war 
powers.92 In no small part, Chief Justice Chase noted, 
“Congress cannot direct the conduct of campaigns.”93 
However, in Hamdan, this acknowledgement came amidst a 
decision where the Court found military commissions 
established by the Bush Administration to try Guantanamo 
detainees invalid in the face of a congressional restriction, 
specifically the Uniform Code of Military Justice.94 Thus, the 
potential acceptance of a broad preclusive core to the 
President’s war powers placed in the context of the ultimate 
decision in Hamdan ends up muddying the waters as to the 
Court’s true belief.95 Other Court decisions related to Bush 
Administration policies as well as past decisions unrelated to 
the Afghan conflict provide similarly inconclusive 
information as to the Court’s characterization of a preclusive 
core.96 Thus, while the Court “surely has not ruled out the 
modern consensus of war powers scholars that the President 
does retain some, not fully specified, preclusive control,”97 its 
decisions have simply not provided any insight into the 
specific preclusive authority of the President and, 
consequently, the President’s authority over prisoner of war 
exchanges. 
Since the Supreme Court offers precious little help at 
coming to a conclusion on this issue, it is prudent to look at 
historical practices concerning prisoner of war exchanges for 
insight into how this power has been utilized in the past. In 
all of the wars fought by the United States, there are only 
two instances where Congress has sought to impose its will 
on prisoner exchanges. The first occurred during the Quasi-
War with France in the 1790s. During this conflict, Congress 
passed several statutes regarding the taking of prisoners.98 
  
 92. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 591-92 (2006). 
 93.  Id. at 592 (quoting Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866)). 
 94. Id. at 620-25; see also Framing the Problem, supra note 66, at 766. 
 95. See Framing the Problem, supra note 66, at 766. 
 96. Id. at 761-67. 
 97. Id. at 766. 
 98. For a summary of these statutes’ provisions, see Saikrishna Bangalore 
Prakash, The Separation and Overlap of War and Military Powers, 87 TEX. L. 
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Of particular note, one statute provided that “the 
President . . . is authorized to exchange or send away from 
the United States to the dominions of France, as he may 
deem proper and expedient, all French citizens that have 
been or may be captured and brought into the United 
States.”99 Another statute passed by Congress during this 
time required the President “to cause the most rigorous 
retaliation to be executed on any such citizens of the French 
Republic, as have been or hereafter may be captured.”100 
During the War of 1812, Congress passed similar provisions 
indicating some inherent power over prisoners of war. In 
particular, one statute authorized the President “to make 
such regulations and arrangements for the safe keeping, 
support and exchange of prisoners of war as he may deem 
expedient.”101  
There are two competing theories as to how one should 
consider these statutes in terms of the executive-legislative 
war powers debate. One commentator has argued that 
Congress was simply trying to encourage the President to use 
prisoners as bargaining chips, and since the statutes do not 
place any substantive restrictions or requirements on the 
President, they amount to nothing more than a symbolic 
gesture.102 In contrast, another commentator reasoned that 
early Congresses believed that the Constitution granted 
Congress power over prisoner of war policy and, as such, they 
were simply exercising that authority.103 Although both 
arguments appear credible, in attempting to argue for a 
preclusive presidential power over prisoner of war 
exchanges, it is difficult to ignore the fact that Congress has 
previously exercised at least some authority over prisoner of 
  
REV. 299, 339-40 (2008); John Yoo, Transferring Terrorists, 79 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1183, 1206-10 (2004). 
 99. Act of Feb. 28, 1799, ch. 18, 1 Stat. 624, 624 (emphasis added). 
 100. Act of Mar. 3, 1799, ch. 45, 1 Stat. 743, 743. 
 101. Act of July 6, 1812, ch. 128, 2 Stat. 777, 777, repealed by Act of Mar. 3, 
1817, ch. 34, 3 Stat. 358 (emphasis added). 
 102. Yoo, supra note 98, at 1209. 
 103. Prakash, supra note 98, at 340. 
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war policy.104 However, the significance of the laws passed 
during the Quasi-War with France and the War of 1812 
diminishes when one considers that: 
in none of the major wars of the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries in which U.S. detention operations are now concluded—
World Wars I and II; Korea and Vietnam; and the 1991 and 2003 
Iraq Wars—has Congress imposed any such restriction [as the 2014 
NDAA] on the exchange, transfer, or release of prisoners, during or 
after the period of armed conflict.105  
In fact, it could be argued, in the words of Justice 
Frankfurter in his concurrence to Youngstown,106 that such 
executive action coupled with congressional inaction with 
regard to prisoner exchanges over the last two hundred years 
should be “treated as a gloss on [E]xecutive Power vested in 
the President,” as it embodies a “systematic, unbroken, 
executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the 
Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by 
Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, 
making as it were such exercise of power part of the structure 
of our government.”107 One point, however, weighs heavily 
against coming to such a conclusion. Specifically, Congress 
likely avoided becoming entangled in prisoner of war matters 
not because it is unconstitutional, but rather because it was 
the pragmatic thing to do. As one commentator noted, “[i]t is 
undisputed that as a general matter Congress should not 
manage in detail military campaigns, and historically 
Congress has not done so. . . . But Congress has the power to 
do so, and political (not constitutional) considerations have 
prevented Congress from doing so.”108  
  
 104. See id. 
 105. Deborah N. Pearlstein, How Wartime Detention Ends, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 
625, 629 (2014); see also Yoo, supra note 98, at 1221 (“With the exception of the 
statutes passed during the Quasi-War with France, and the War of 1812, 
authorizing the President to take and retaliate against prisoners of war, Congress 
has never sought to regulate the disposition of POWs or asserted that it has any 
authority over them.”). 
 106. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).  
 107.  Id. at 610-11 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 108. Lobel, supra note 65, at 415. 
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In sum, recent scholarly work, Supreme Court doctrine, 
and historical practice fail to provide a definitive answer to 
the issue of whether the President has preclusive authority 
over all prisoner of war exchanges. While there are strong 
arguments that support concurrent war powers between 
Congress and the President as well as clear historical 
examples of Congress freely exercising some authority over 
prisoner of war policy, there is simply not enough evidence to 
be certain that preclusive executive authority over prisoner 
of war exchanges does not exist. Likewise, however, this 
sentiment prevents one from definitively concluding that the 
Bergdahl exchange was a constitutional exercise of the 
President’s general authority over prisoner of war exchanges. 
2. The President’s Authority over Prisoner of War 
Exchanges Involving Imminent Danger to a U.S. 
Soldier’s Life 
Perhaps the uncertainty regarding the extent of the 
President’s authority over prisoner of war exchanges is why 
the Obama Administration, as it did with its implied 
exception argument, seems to rely solely on the President’s 
constitutionally mandated “power to protect” to support its 
constitutional override theory.109 The President’s power to 
protect has long been recognized as an independent, 
substantive power granted to the President as the Chief 
Executive and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces that 
allows the President to take unilateral military action to 
protect the lives of American citizens and U.S. soldiers 
abroad.110 Therefore, on its face, the Administration can 
readily justify the application of this power because the 
Bergdahl swap took place in the context of Bergdahl’s 
severely declining health, which allowed the Administration 
to argue that abiding by the 30-day notice requirement would 
  
 109. Wittes, supra note 33. 
 110. SOLICITOR, DEP’T OF STATE, RIGHT TO PROTECT CITIZENS IN FOREIGN 
COUNTRIES BY LANDING FORCES: MEMORANDUM OF THE SOLICITOR FOR THE 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, OCT. 5, 1912, at 43 (2d ed. 1929) [hereinafter RIGHT TO 
PROTECT CITIZENS]. 
1348 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
jeopardize Bergdahl’s life.111 Furthermore, as the previous 
Section noted, the action taken by the President to effectuate 
Bergdahl’s release, the exchange of five Taliban detainees, 
was clearly within the President’s power in light of 
congressional authorization for the Afghan conflict.112 Of 
course, this power over wartime detainees was found to be 
insufficient to decisively conclude that the President’s action 
was lawful. Thus, the second question posed earlier is now at 
hand: Does the President have preclusive authority over 
prisoner of war exchanges where a U.S. soldier’s life is in 
imminent danger? Or, more precisely, does the power to 
protect grant the President an extremely narrow preclusive 
power to transfer wartime detainees to save the life of a 
captive U.S. soldier? 
Supreme Court doctrine regarding the President’s power 
to protect is somewhat ambiguous, but a few cases are worth 
addressing. First, in The Slaughterhouse Cases, the Court 
recognized that a “privilege of a citizen of the United States 
is to demand the care and protection of the Federal 
government over his life, liberty, and property 
when . . . within the jurisdiction of a foreign government.”113 
Additionally, in In re Neagle, the Court articulated the 
general idea that the Constitution provides the executive 
branch an inherent power to protect.114 Specifically, in finding 
that the Attorney General had lawfully assigned a U.S. 
Marshal to protect a federal judge, the Court reasoned that 
the President’s constitutional mandate to “take care that the 
laws be faithfully executed” is not limited to “the enforcement 
of acts of congress or of treaties of the United States 
according to their express terms,” but necessarily includes 
“the rights, duties and obligations growing out of the 
Constitution itself, our international relations, and all the 
protection implied by the nature of the government under the 
  
 111. See Wittes, supra note 33 (“[T]he Administration had determined that 
providing notice as specified in the statute would undermine the Executive’s 
efforts to protect the life of a U.S. soldier.”). 
 112. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 113. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1872).  
 114.  135 U.S. 1, 67 (1890). 
2015] LEAVE NO SOLDIER BEHIND? 1349 
Constitution.”115 However, the most express judicial 
recognition of this power occurred outside of the Supreme 
Court in Durand v. Hollins, an 1860 case from the Circuit 
Court for the Southern District of New York.116 In upholding 
presidential authority to order a naval commander to 
bombard Greytown, Nicaragua in retaliation for a riot that 
injured U.S. citizens, the court noted “as it respects the 
interposition of the executive abroad, for the protection of the 
lives or property of the citizen, the duty must, of necessity, 
rest in the discretion of the [P]resident.”117 Therefore, while 
judicial doctrine does not establish the extent of the power to 
protect American lives abroad, it clearly recognizes it as an 
independent power of the President.118  
To understand whether the power to protect is a 
preclusive power, then, historical assertions of this power 
should be examined. Although there is no example directly 
on point, history is ripe with situations where the President 
has taken unilateral military action pursuant to this 
mandate.119 For instance, this power has been utilized at least 
as far back as Thomas Jefferson’s presidency, when in 1805 
he instructed military officers to protect U.S. citizens from 
Spanish attacks despite lacking any express grant of 
authority from Congress.120 More recently, the 
administrations of Presidents Ford, Carter, Reagan, George 
H.W. Bush, Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama have all in 
  
 115. Id. at 64 (emphasis removed). 
 116. 8 F. Cas. 111 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (No. 4186). 
 117. Id. at 112. 
 118. See Michael P. Kelly, Fixing the War Powers, 141 MIL. L. REV. 83, 142 
(1993) (“[Durand] exemplifies judicial recognition of an early, longstanding 
practice. No court has declared this authority a ‘constitutional fact,’ but it meets 
the criteria of one.”). 
 119. Arthur H. Garrison, The History of Executive Branch Legal Opinions on the 
Power of the President as Commander-in-Chief from Washington to Obama, 43 
CUMB. L. REV. 375, 458 (2013). 
 120. RIGHT TO PROTECT CITIZENS, supra note 110. This may not have even been 
President Jefferson’s first assertion of this power. See Kelly, supra note 118, at 
139-40. 
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one form or another asserted the constitutional authority to 
act unilaterally in protecting the lives of Americans abroad.121  
Two of the more relevant examples come from the 
Administrations of Presidents Ford and Carter. In 1975, at 
the close of the Vietnam War, a number of U.S. citizens and 
foreign nationals needed evacuation from South Vietnam and 
Cambodia.122 However, “[s]tatutory limitations barring the 
use of funds for the involvement of U.S. armed forces in 
combat activities and hostilities in Southeast Asia arguably 
prohibited the use of armed forces to rescue U.S. nationals 
and foreigners.”123 After convening a joint session of Congress 
to plead for clarification on the extent of the limitations, 
President Ford took action without waiting for congressional 
approval.124 He ordered U.S. troops to evacuate thousands of 
U.S. citizens and foreign nationals from both locations.125 Two 
weeks later, Ford took similar unilateral action in ordering 
U.S. troops to rescue the crew of a U.S. merchant ship, the 
Mayaguez, which had been seized by Cambodia.126 Although 
the Ford Administration did not explicitly refer to the 
President’s power to protect in defense of its actions, 
President Ford did “reference . . . both his inherent ‘executive 
power and his authority as Commander in Chief.’”127 
Furthermore, the Ford Administration implied that the 
powers it had utilized were preclusive.128  
  
 121. See Garrison, supra note 119, at 428-78 (discussing examples of such 
assertions for each of these Presidents). 
 122. A Constitutional History, supra note 71, at 1072.  
 123. Id. at 1072 & n.530 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 124. Id. 
 125. Id.  
 126. Id. at 1073. 
 127. Peter Raven-Hansen & William C. Banks, Pulling the Purse Strings of the 
Commander in Chief, 80 VA. L. REV. 833, 916 (1994) (quoting Text of President 
Ford’s Report to Congress on Ship, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1975, at 15). 
 128. See id. (“State Department Legal Advisor Monroe Leigh supported 
President Ford’s claim and asserted that these inherent powers could not 
constitutionally be restricted.”). 
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The Carter Administration exercised similar executive 
power in 1979, during the Iran hostage crisis.129 After Iranian 
students had taken sixty-three members of the U.S. embassy 
hostage, the Carter Administration used the President’s 
constitutional obligation to protect American lives to justify 
several operations in an attempt to save the hostages.130 
Notably, the Carter Administration asserted this power to 
override congressional notification requirements in two 
different statutes.131  
The actions of both the Ford and Carter Administrations 
are the closest scenarios to the Bergdahl exchange that 
provide some evidence that the power to protect is part of the 
preclusive core of executive war powers. One important 
difference between them, however, is that the actions of the 
Ford and Carter Administrations involved deploying troops 
in attempts to save the lives of American citizens and 
soldiers, while the Bergdahl exchange involved the release of 
wartime detainees to protect Bergdahl’s life. Thus, it is 
important to square the two uses of authority. The 
President’s power to deploy troops absent congressional 
authorization pursuant to the power to protect is clearly 
established, and this exercise of authority is understood as 
deriving from the Commander in Chief clause.132 Similarly, 
the President’s authority over wartime detainees also comes 
from the Commander in Chief clause—with the added caveat 
  
 129. Garrison, supra note 119, at 433. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See Geoffrey Corn, Triggering Congressional War Powers Notification: A 
Proposal to Reconcile Constitutional Practice with Operational Reality, 14 LEWIS 
& CLARK L. REV. 687, 732 (2010) (noting that the Carter Administration did not 
believe it needed to abide by the notification requirement in the War Powers 
Resolution); Robert F. Turner, The Constitution and the Iran-Contra Affair: Was 
Congress the Real Lawbreaker?, 11 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 83, 123-24, 113 n.111 (1988) 
(noting that the Carter Administration did not abide by the “timely” notification 
requirement of section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947); Cyrus R. Vance, 
Striking the Balance: Congress and the President Under the War Powers 
Resolution, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 89 (1984) (“There were those in the [Carter] 
administration who favored consulting congressional leaders in accordance with 
section 3 of the War Powers Resolution before our units were set in motion. 
However, concerns for secrecy prevailed.”).  
 132. See Kelly, supra note 118 (“Congress generally concedes that the 
Commander-in-Chief clause includes this independent power.”). 
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that congressional authorization must activate that power.133 
Here, because the AUMF activated the President’s authority 
over the five Taliban detainees, his decision to release them 
requires no further grant of authority than did the 
deployment of troops by the Ford and Carter Administrations 
in the situations discussed above. Thus, one could argue that, 
like the Ford and Carter Administrations’ deployment of 
troops in contravention of established law, the release of the 
five Taliban detainees without following the 2014 NDAA’s 
30-day notice requirement was a valid exercise of the 
President’s preclusive authority to protect American citizens 
and U.S. soldiers abroad. 
The Administration’s constitutional override theory 
appears to have some promising weight to it. However, the 
idea that the actions of the Ford and Carter Administrations 
were exercises of preclusive authority is not without its 
critics. For instance, while acknowledging the significance of 
President Ford’s exercise of power in the evacuation and 
rescue in Vietnam and Cambodia, two commentators 
characterized the situation as an exception to historical 
presidential action and still concluded that the only 
preclusive core to the President’s war powers was the power 
of superintendence.134 Furthermore, Ford’s actions were 
criticized by “then-Assistant Senate Legal Counsel Glennon, 
who had argued that the funding restrictions prohibited the 
evacuations and Mayaguez operations, [and] asserted that 
‘[t]he power of the President to commit the armed forces to 
hostilities is subordinate to the power of the Congress to deny 
funds.’”135 Finally, in discussing the protective power of the 
presidency generally, another commentator acknowledged 
that while a President’s authority to act in a true emergency 
is a question that has existed since the founding, “no 
  
 133. See supra Part III.B.1. 
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presidential authority to act contra legem exists.”136 
Therefore, while the Obama Administration’s use of the 
power to protect to justify the Bergdahl swap does not appear 
unprecedented, arguments against this theory persist and, 
accordingly, definitive preclusive authority in this situation 
remains elusive.  
C. Conclusion 
The Obama Administration proffered two distinct legal 
theories in defense of its decision to ignore the 2014 NDAA’s 
30-day notice requirement in executing the Bergdahl 
exchange. Its statutory, implied exception theory argued for 
a narrow construction of the notice requirement that 
excepted situations such as the Bergdahl swap. On the other 
hand, its constitutional override theory asserted that the 
notice requirement was unconstitutional in circumstances 
where it might impinge on the President’s constitutional 
mandate to protect the lives of American citizens and 
soldiers. An examination of these two theories revealed that, 
while both are colorable arguments, neither one provides the 
sort of definitive authority necessary to determine whether 
the Obama Administration’s action was lawful.  
Notably, a genuine answer to this question is unlikely to 
surface. First, neither Congress nor the President is likely to 
take any definitive action surrounding this issue. While the 
executive branch will no doubt continue to write legal 
opinions while Congress holds hearings and conducts 
investigations, history has shown that the stalemate 
surrounding this type of authority will not break. 
Additionally, the courts are unlikely to ever hear a case of 
this kind.137 There will never be any litigation pertaining to 
the Administration’s conduct in the Bergdahl exchange 
because the injuries are not personal and therefore “not 
  
 136. Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 11 (1993). 
 137. Jack Goldsmith, One or Two Other Statutes the President Likely 
Disregarded in The Bergdahl Deal, LAWFARE BLOG (June 2, 2014, 7:45 PM), 
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sufficient for standing.”138 Specifically, releasing inmates 
from Guantanamo does not harm a specific person, and 
though it is feasible to argue that the public at-large is 
somehow injured, that alone is insufficient.139 Although there 
is a case currently before the D.C. Circuit that argues, among 
other things, that the transfer restrictions on Guantanamo 
detainees are an unconstitutional impingement of the 
President’s Commander in Chief power, the prospects for the 
case are not promising.140 For one, the trial court dismissed 
the original case for lack of standing.141 Furthermore, time 
and again courts have refused to “resolve definitively the 
precise contours of Congress’s power to control the 
President’s war powers.”142 Thus, even if this case is heard on 
the merits, it is hard to believe that any ruling as to that 
particular argument is forthcoming.  
Clarity on this subject will continue to be elusive, an 
unsettling reality because the question directly affects the 
life of any U.S. soldier taken captive. Therefore, it is 
incredibly important to provide a definitive answer to the 
constitutional question at issue—not just for the soldiers that 
we are sending off to war in increasingly non-traditional 
circumstances, but also for the public and our political 
leaders. The final Part of this Comment proposes a solution 
to this problem by arguing that important policy 
considerations necessitate the recognition of exclusive 
presidential authority over prisoner of war exchanges.  
IV. THE PRESIDENT SHOULD HAVE EXCLUSIVE AUTHORITY TO 
CONDUCT PRISONER OF WAR EXCHANGES 
As this Comment has shown, there is simply no definitive 
answer to the legal question implicated by the Bergdahl 
  
 138. Zack Beauchamp, A New Report Says Obama’s Bowe Bergdahl Prisoner 
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No. 14-5116 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 141. Id. at 277. 
 142. Framing the Problem, supra note 66, at 766. 
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swap. However, the political and public uproar following the 
exchange demonstrates that providing such an answer is of 
considerable importance. Accordingly, this Comment 
suggests that policy concerns warrant the recognition of an 
exclusive authority for the executive branch to perform 
prisoner of war exchanges. There are three major policy 
concerns that are relevant in arriving at this conclusion: (1) 
concerns that granting this limited power could lead to a grab 
for more expansive wartime power by the President; (2) the 
potential that unilateral decision making in this context may 
lead to undesirable or even dangerous results; and (3) the 
military ethos to never leave a soldier behind. 
A. Expanding Executive Power 
There is a valid concern that congressional and judicial 
acquiescence to presidential authority in this narrow context 
could bleed over into more expansive wartime powers. For 
instance, some commentators have expressed concerns over 
the Supreme Court ever expressly acknowledging preclusive 
wartime authority for the executive branch because of the 
potential for a President to use it to justify expansive powers 
akin to those asserted by the Bush Administration.143 
However, such concerns seem unwarranted in the context of 
a narrowly tailored power that gives the President the 
authority to exchange enemy combatants captured during an 
armed conflict for a U.S. soldier taken captive during that 
conflict. In particular, such a power does not impliedly give 
the President the exclusive authority to set wartime 
detention policies, nor does it run the risk of justifying 
detainee abuse.144 By simply accepting this narrow, exclusive 
authority in the President, the legislature and judiciary 
provide no statutes or legal opinions to interpret nor any 
constitutional powers to balance. There is no doubt that 
creative legal minds in the executive branch could challenge 
this seemingly straightforward authority. However, the only 
obviously arguable facts would be whether the detainee(s) 
and the exchanged-for soldier(s) were taken captive during 
  
 143. A Constitutional History, supra note 71, at 1106-07. 
 144. These were two major concerns that arose as a result of the Bush 
Administration’s legal philosophies. See id. at 1110-11. 
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the same conflict. That determination is a more difficult 
question than it may initially seem considering the 
complexities of the global war on terror, but not an impossible 
task. Such a rule would apply only to soldiers (as opposed to 
civilians) taken captive during an identifiable conflict—a 
qualification that necessarily restricts where and by whom a 
soldier could be taken captive.145 
Other issues raised along with this concern include the 
contention that Congress’s participation in the process helps 
to legitimize it146 and prevents errors in judgment by the 
President.147 While such points are valid, the type of 
considered, drawn-out debate that Congress provides is not 
suited to time-sensitive prisoner exchanges, such as the 
Bergdahl swap. Furthermore, when more time is available, 
there is no reason to believe that the executive branch would 
be any more prone to making an unwise or hasty decision 
than Congress. In fact, leaving the decision solely up to the 
President allows him or her to face any public or political 
scrutiny on his or her own, while preventing any political 
games from being played with an American soldier still in 
enemy hands. The idea that the President and Congress 
could play politics to the detriment of a captive U.S. soldier 
is not far-fetched considering the hyper-partisan 
environment in Washington.148 While there is certainly a 
traditional influence that a President carries during 
wartime,149 the expansive power wielded by the Bush 
Administration and constant calls of executive overreach 
leveled against the Obama Administration may have 
withered that influence away. In the end, the concern that a 
limited grant of preclusive power in this context could bleed 
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over into more expansive powers is insufficient on its own to 
discourage recognizing such authority. 
B. Potential for Disproportionate or Dangerous Results 
A second policy concern that is relevant in examining 
whether an exclusive executive power over prisoner of war 
exchanges should be recognized is the potential for 
disproportionate or dangerous results. In particular, two 
major criticisms that have been leveled at the Obama 
Administration regarding the Bergdahl exchange are that 
the President negotiated with terrorists and that the price of 
five Taliban detainees for one U.S. soldier was too high.150 
However, a reasoned look at these criticisms only serves to 
demonstrate the type of political squabbling that can occur 
with a soldier’s life in the balance. First, regarding the 
concern that the Administration paid too high a price, a brief 
look at past prisoner exchanges reveals that disproportionate 
results are a rather common occurrence. For example, in 
1953, 6670 Communist prisoners were exchanged for only 
684 UN-affiliated personnel as the Korean War was winding 
down.151 In this instance, despite intense political and public 
debate surrounding the disposition of war prisoners, 
Congress passed no laws and the exchange was handled by 
executive agreement.152 Additionally, in 1973, the Paris 
Accords that ended the U.S. conflict in Vietnam “brought 591 
Americans back home, including now-Sen. John McCain, in 
exchange for the release of 2,600 NVA soldiers.”153 Finally, in 
a more recent example not involving the United States, 
longtime ally Israel traded 1027 Palestinian prisoners for one 
Israeli soldier.154 Thus, it is safe to conclude that criticisms of 
the “5 for 1” Bergdahl swap are somewhat overstated. 
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Importantly, however, these examples are not intended to 
justify or legitimize the Bergdahl swap, as that question is 
correctly left to political and public debate. Instead, they are 
meant to put this particular criticism into perspective and 
show that disparate results in prisoner exchanges are a well-
established cost of war. As such, this concern should not 
weigh heavily against recognizing exclusive executive power 
in this arena. 
Another criticism pertaining to the cost of the Bergdahl 
exchange involves the dangerousness of the released Taliban 
detainees and the concern that they could re-engage in 
militant activities.155 While this apprehension is 
understandable,156 it is not unique to the Bergdahl exchange. 
As one commentator notes:  
The notion of returning prisoners to a homeland of violent political 
instability, for example, is not new. We returned prisoners twice to 
post-war European nations whose economic, political, and state 
security systems had been decimated by what were then the most 
destructive wars history had ever known. Neither is it the case that 
we would never release prisoners who still harbor violent intentions 
toward the United States. In World War II, among the first 
prisoners released were those Nazis whose enmity was “most 
hardened” against us. Nor can it be contended that we would never 
release prisoners as long as they have ideological brethren with 
whom they might again affiliate in re-engaging the fight. We 
returned thousands of communist prisoners to communist 
nations—for a half-century our most feared, most hated ideological 
opponents—at the height of a half-century long war that was “hot” 
(in Korea and Vietnam) almost as often as it was cold, and that was 
defined by the standing deployment of U.S. armed forces to 
countries all over the world.157 
The United States has also not differentiated state from 
non-state enemies in the exchange of prisoners.158 During the 
Vietnam War, the U.S. unilaterally released Viet Cong 
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prisoners with the hope that it would inspire better 
treatment of our soldiers taken captive.159 Additionally, 
during the Civil War, the President “negotiated terms for the 
exchange of civilian prisoners captured by the Union army 
during military operations.”160 Again, such examples are not 
meant to lend merit to the Bergdahl swap, but simply offer 
further perspective of the critique that there is something 
wholly different about current detainees that requires 
congressional oversight. 
The final criticism that implicates the potential for 
undesired results should exclusive presidential authority 
over prisoner exchanges be recognized is the claim that the 
President broke a central foreign policy directive to not 
negotiate with terrorists.161 Because of the unique facts 
surrounding Bergdahl’s capture and subsequent release, this 
claim is a little murky. However, it has been one of the most 
consistent critiques of the swap. The main issue concerns 
Bergdahl’s initial disappearance. In particular, the Taliban 
captured Bergdahl after he left his unit’s outpost.162 Then, 
shortly after that initial capture, it is widely believed that the 
Taliban transferred Bergdahl into the control of the Haqqani 
network.163 After this transfer, Bergdahl likely spent the 
majority of his captivity under Haqqani control in northwest 
Pakistan.164  
The uncertainty about Bergdahl’s whereabouts during 
his captivity drives much of the argument in favor of this 
claim. Specifically, while the Taliban is not considered a 
terrorist organization by the U.S. government, the Haqqani 
network is.165 What further muddies the waters of this claim 
is that the deal for Bergdahl was brokered directly with 
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Qatar, a recognized sovereign nation.166 In short, those who 
choose to believe that the Administration negotiated with 
terrorists have a point; especially when considering that 
Bergdahl was primarily held by a well-known terrorist 
organization. However, it is also not a stretch to characterize 
the exchange as a fairly standard prisoner of war negotiation 
with a non-state enemy force.167  
Even if one believes that the Administration violated the 
foreign policy directive to not negotiate with terrorists, a look 
at past practice again undermines this critique. For instance, 
the federal government has negotiated with terrorist 
organizations as far back as 1784 when Congress 
appropriated about $80,000 as tribute to the Barbary nations 
to prevent pirate attacks on U.S. ships.168 The Carter 
Administration engaged in negotiations with Iranians, who 
took Americans hostage in Iran, and achieved their release 
only after unfreezing about $11 billion in assets.169 President 
Reagan notoriously traded arms to the Iranians to secure the 
release of Americans held in Lebanon,170 while President 
Clinton met with Gerry Adams of the Irish Republican Army, 
an organization that, at the time, was on the State 
Department’s terror list.171 Finally, the Bush Administration 
cut deals with Sunni insurgents in Iraq’s Anbar province, 
working with and paying people who had been killing 
American soldiers.172 This is not to condone any of these 
actions nor debate the relative merits of negotiating with 
unsavory organizations. However, to criticize the 
Administration’s action in this instance as violating some 
sacred principle is disingenuous. Furthermore, to use it as a 
reason against recognizing exclusive executive power over 
prisoner exchanges—while making for an attention grabbing 
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headline—only serves to distract from the group that serves 
to benefit the most, captive U.S. soldiers.  
C. The Military Ethos to Leave No Soldier Behind 
While the above policy concerns may cause some to 
question the wisdom of recognizing exclusive executive 
authority over prisoner of war exchanges, the military ethos 
to leave no one behind should put those concerns to rest. The 
President, as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, 
bears this obligation to all of those under his command. It is 
a sacred principle that American service members hold 
dear,173 and it is irresponsible to send troops into battle 
without a clear understanding of what steps will be taken to 
ensure they are not left behind. The most direct way of doing 
so is to give the Commander in Chief a clear mandate over 
all prisoner exchanges, thus enabling him or her to take 
swift, unilateral action when circumstances require it. 
Although the Bergdahl case comes with the emotionally 
charged element of his alleged desertion, this authority must 
exist regardless of the circumstances surrounding the service 
member’s capture. It would be unwise to allow this fact to 
condition the President’s exclusive authority to negotiate for 
service members’ release. Specifically, there are any number 
of circumstances that could call a service members’ capture 
into question and require a legal review.174 John Bellinger, a 
former State Department lawyer under President George W. 
Bush, may have put this controversial issue best when he 
said, “[w]e don’t leave soldiers on the battle field under any 
circumstance unless they have actually joined the enemy 
army . . . [Bergdahl] was a young 20-year-old. Young 20-year-
olds make stupid decisions. . . . [I]f you make a stupid 
decision [we do not] leave you in the hands of the Taliban.”175 
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The then-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General 
Martin Dempsey, and the Secretary of the Army, John 
McHugh, as well as many other military officials, agree with 
this sentiment.176 While there is no doubt that Bergdahl 
should face military justice if he did, in fact, desert,177 a solid 
prisoner of war policy should rest on the non-partisan legal 
principle that, like any other American citizen and soldier in 
the armed forces, one is entitled to the presumption of 
innocence. Granting the President unilateral authority to 
secure a soldier’s release does not and should not affect any 
eventual adjudication process.  
Finally, also relevant to this discussion is that soldiers 
are being sent into increasingly unconventional conflicts. 
Except for the first Gulf War and the initial invasion in Iraq, 
the United States military has not fought a traditional, large-
scale conflict with another nation-state in decades.178 
Accordingly, the era of large, traditionally negotiated 
prisoner exchanges that were commonplace in the major 
wars of the past are, for the foreseeable future, unlikely to 
take place. What is more probable is that non-state enemies 
that provide, at best, uncertain captivity conditions will take 
smaller numbers of our soldiers captive. This sets up 
circumstances that will more likely than not replicate those 
of the Bergdahl swap, where a drawn-out congressional 
debate and the inevitable political squabbling that goes along 
with it could work to the detriment of a captive soldier.  
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D. Conclusion 
The focus of prisoner of war exchanges should not be on 
devising creative legal arguments used to justify the actions, 
but on doing what is necessary to bring captive soldiers home. 
The uproar following the Bergdahl exchange included several 
scathing critiques that provide salient policy concerns 
relevant to the proposed solution of recognizing exclusive 
executive authority over prisoner exchanges. However, an 
examination of these concerns, including the potential 
expansion of presidential wartime powers and the fear of 
undesirable or even dangerous results, demonstrates that 
they are mostly overstated and represent, at best, politicians 
playing political games with soldiers’ lives, and, at worst, a 
precursor to more restrictive conditions on future exchanges. 
Granting the executive branch exclusive authority to make 
prisoner exchanges removes the threat of potentially 
dangerous congressional restrictions, prevents critics from 
arguing that the President has broken the law by negotiating 
for the release of a U.S. soldier, and tempers the ability of 
politicians to use our captive soldiers to score political points. 
Furthermore, the military ethos to leave no soldier behind 
represents a meaningful policy that deserves some authority. 
Simply put, that ethos should stand for the principle that our 
soldiers can go off to war believing that their Commander in 
Chief has the authority to negotiate their release without the 
fear of restrictive laws standing in the way. 
CONCLUSION 
When President Obama announced the recovery of Sgt. 
Bowe Bergdahl from the Taliban in exchange for five Taliban 
detainees, a public and political uproar ensued. While the 
emotionally charged element of Bergdahl’s alleged desertion 
stirred a fair amount of anger, the bulk of the criticism 
leveled at the Administration consisted of policy concerns 
and the Administration’s disregard of the 30-day 
congressional notice requirement contained in the 2014 
NDAA. As this Comment has shown, the question of whether 
the Administration actually broke the law is incredibly 
difficult to answer. Although recent scholarship has 
reimagined the structure of executive and legislative war 
powers, there is no doubt that some preclusive core to the 
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President’s wartime authority still exists. However, a precise 
definition of those powers is elusive, and even the recognition 
of a narrow authority to conduct a prisoner exchange to save 
the life of a captive U.S. soldier is unclear.  
To bring clarity to this issue and to prevent a President 
from having to choose between a captive soldier’s life and a 
constitutionally questionable law, Congress and the judiciary 
should recognize exclusive authority for the President to 
negotiate prisoner of war exchanges. The recognition of such 
power is not without its concerns, but the overriding need to 
keep the political branches from engaging in a futile dispute 
over constitutional authority in this arena compels the 
recognition of such power. Doing so will provide the President 
with the flexibility to deal with prisoner exchanges in 
unconventional circumstances and ensure our soldiers can go 
off to war under any context knowing their Commander in 
Chief has the authority to make every effort to bring them 
home. 
